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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION The concentration of major trauma experience at Camp Bastion has allowed continuous improvements to occur
in the patient pathway from the point of wounding to surgical treatment. These changes have involved clinical management as
well as alterations to the physical layout of the hospital, training and decision making. Consideration of the human factors has
been a major part of these improvements.
METHODS We describe the Camp Bastion patient pathway with the communication template that focused decision making at
various key moments during damage control resuscitation and damage control surgery (DCR–DCS). This system identifies four
key stages: ‘command huddle’, ‘snap brief’, ‘sit-reps’ (situation reports) and ‘sign-out/debrief’. The attitude of staff to communi-
cation and decision making is also evaluated.
RESULTS Twenty cases admitted to Camp Bastion with battlefield injuries were studied from 6 September to 6 October 2012.
Qualitative responses from 115 members of staff were collected. All patients were haemodynamically shocked with a median
pH of 7.25 (range: 6.83–7.40) and a median of 18 units of mixed red cells and plasma were transfused. In 89% of instances,
theatre staff were aware of what was required of them at the beginning of the case, 86% felt there were regular updates and
93% understood what was required of them as the case progressed.
CONCLUSIONS The evolution of the hospital at Camp Bastion has been a unique learning experience in the field of major
trauma. The Defence Medical Services have responded with continuous innovation to optimise DCR–DCS for seriously injured
patients. Together with the improvements in clinical care, a communication and decision making matrix was developed. Staff
evaluation showed a high degree of satisfaction with the quality of communication.
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Damage control resuscitation (DCR) and damage control
surgery (DCS) are established UK military doctrine for the
initial management of severely injured patients.1 However,
taking the theory and converting it into a practical, workable
solution has required a continuous process of meticulous
data collection, research, audit and service improvement.2
The actual patient pathway has therefore evolved signifi-
cantly from the early days of the tented hospital to the
present layout in the purpose built hospital.3 Each step in
the patient transfer on arrival to Camp Bastion has been
considered carefully, from the use of tourniquets4 at the
point of injury in order to control catastrophic haemorrhage
to the medical emergency response team.5 These medical
teams arrive by Chinook helicopter to collect patients for
transfer to Camp Bastion; the purpose is to bring care as far
forwards as possible and minimise the time to reach medical
treatment.
Not only has clinical practice evolved but the physical
floor plan has changed in Camp Bastion to improve the
ergonomics of transfer. Furthermore, there has been a con-
centration on human factors to optimise leadership, team-
work and the multidisciplinary approach.6
The need for urgent treatment in the most severely injured
patients, especially in a busy trauma hospital such as at
Camp Bastion where multiply injured casualties are often
evacuated from the battlefield to the emergency department
(ED) in a short time, meant that established communication
techniques sometimes failed to keep the team adequately
informed and updated while dealing with the casualty.7 The
authors of the ‘10 seconds for 10 minutes’ principle identified
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in a simulation laboratory that even in emergencies, taking
time to assess the situation, which aims to teach followership
and leadership among other skills, improved decision mak-
ing and made the team work effectively.8 The newly estab-
lished European Trauma Course teaches teamworking and
leadership, uses a five-second check done by the team leader
on the arrival of the casualty, prior to the team starting
work.9,10 This allows the team leader and team members an
overview of the patient, which is vital to maintaining situa-
tional awareness and forming a mental model.
Both approaches place human factors and communications
at the very centre of the management of sick patients. Similar
evidence is published on the need for concentrating on human
factors in the operating theatre.11–14 Best practice assumes
good communication to sequence and coordinate the proc-
esses. This is taught in detail by the Defence Medical Services
with intensive training for revision just before deployment.15–17
The World Health Organization (WHO) surgical safety check-
list, introduced in 2009,18–20 helps to reduce ‘never events’ and
improves briefing of the team.21 It has also been reported to
reduce hospital mortality.21 It was not, however, designed to
optimise communication in the rapidly changing situation
faced by the ED and operating room (OR) teams dealing with
a severely injured patient. A discussion paper published in
2012 therefore sought to improve and streamline communica-
tion specifically during the DCR–DCS sequence.22
The patient pathway
Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the front
end of the Camp Bastion hospital footprint while Figure 2
shows the communications system, known as the ‘Trauma
WHO Checklist’. Virtually all injured patients arrived by
helicopter, transferred either by the British or American
teams landing at the helicopter landing site approximately
200 metres from the hospital. Transfer was by ambulance
to the front of the ED with triage occurring at several
stages in the process. The numbers below relate to the
points on Figure 1:
1. Detailed information was sent directly from the Patient
Evacuation Coordination Cell to the hospital, informing
them of the type of incident as well as the number and
severity of casualties due to arrive. This allowed the
consultant of the ED to call out the trauma teams, and
to allocate relevant resources and staff to the correct
number of beds in the ED and theatres.
2. The ED consultant met the ambulances on arrival and
allocated them to a resuscitation bay. Although this was
usually decided in advance based on the radioed infor-
mation, it occasionally changed again.
2.1. While the patient was being unloaded by the recep-
tion teams, the senior transferring clinician (doctor
or paramedic) gave the accepting team a briefing
based on the ‘ATMIST’ handover system (Table 1). It
was vital that the trauma team were disciplined and
remained focused and silent during the handover.
Often the prehospital doctor entered the ED prior to
the patient, allowing for less distraction. However, if
the patient arrived at the same time, he or she
would only have been looked at to confirm there
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Figure 1 Diagrammatic representation of the British military hospital at Camp Bastion and the patient pathway during damage control
surgery (not to scale)
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was no ongoing catastrophic haemorrhage or air-
way obstruction. All other treatment commenced
after the handover had finished.
3. The patient arrived in the resuscitation bay on a stretcher
and was transferred to the hospital trolley. A <C>ABC
approach4 to injury identification and management was
followed under the leadership of the ED team leader
using a horizontal resuscitation approach.23
3.1. Occasionally, a severely injured patient with
ongoing haemorrhage may have gone straight to
the operating theatre without stopping in an ED
bay, known as ‘right turn resuscitation’.24 (The
direction of patient flow has evolved over recent
years so readers will note from the floorplan that
at the time of writing it was actually a left turn to
the theatres.) In this case, the entire ED trauma
team stayed with the patient to do the primary sur-
vey and identify injuries while the surgeon/anaes-
thetist managed the catastrophic haemorrhage.
The Trauma WHO
1. Command Huddle
2. Snap Brief
3. Sit Reps (10 seconds every 10-30 mins)
4. Sign out and Debrief
4 vital steps to optimising comms in DCS
Continuous communication is vital during Damage Control Resuscitation & Surgery (DCS).
The Trauma WHO is a means of enhancing this. It should be used for time critical patients
i.e. Right turn resus, massive transfusions and urgent transfers to theatre for any reason.
The situation can change rapidly during damage control surgery. The sit-reps, usually lead
by anaesthetics, should be quick and inform all members of the team of the patient's status.
 - T Time since the start of the procedure. Temperature
 - B BP, Blood volume given so far, Blood gases
 - C Clotting (i.e. ROTEM results)
 - S Surgical progress and plan
As the surgery / anaesthesia enters a more stable phase a common sense approach
should be taken and the urgent nature and frequency of the 'Sit-reps' should be reduced.
it is important that all members of the theatre team check we have the right patient and
know what is about to happen. In a time critical situation it is essential to be concise.
- Surgeon confirms the correct patient, the clinical & imaging findings and the surgical plan
- Anaesthetist states the T(temp), B(BP, blood given, blood gas), C(clotting) & other issues
- Confirm antibiotics given, TXA given, blood available
- The time of the start of the procedure should be recorded on a board (this is Time Zero)
At the end of the operation a sign-out is essential for both the surgeon and the anaesthetist
to summarise the patient's injuries, what has been done and what has been left untreated.
This should ideally be done in the presence of the accepting team (probably ITU). A debrief
should be done immediately after the sign-out as the team will rapidly disperse.
Occurs early in resus / evaluation - usually in ED. Decision made jointly by ED, Surgeons,
Anaesthesia, DMD i.e. Should patient go to Theatre, CT Scan or Ward. Theatre team
leader to be involved. Futility of continuing treatment should also be considered.
Figure 2 Aide-mémoire for time critical surgery, especially damage control resuscitation and surgery
Table 1 ‘ATMIST’ handover
A Age of patient
T Time of incident
M Mechanism of injury
I Injuries (from top to toe)
S vital Signs
T Treatments given so far
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3.2. Once the initial assessment was complete, the ED
team leader called a ‘command huddle’ in conjunc-
tion with the anaesthetist and the senior surgeon,
to establish appropriate treatment (or possible
futility), which was usually going either to theatre,
to computed tomography or straight to the ward.22
4. The majority of patients with penetrating battlefield inju-
ries went to the OR. On arrival, the anaesthetist called
time out for a ‘snap brief’, modelled on the WHO check-
list but streamlined specifically for the most urgent time
critical patients. It must be remembered that unlike an
elective operating list, these patients may arrive in thea-
tre within minutes of arriving in the department so the
theatre team could have very little warning of the patient
or what to expect. As a result, it is essential that the key
information is communicated to the entire team in a set
format to make sure that nothing is missed.
5. The time of the start of surgery was noted on a board in
theatre and documented during the snap brief so that
the importance of time was not lost.
5.1. The situation changes rapidly during DCS as new
injuries are discovered and the patient’s physiology
fluctuates in regard to his or her injuries and treat-
ment. Furthermore, multiple surgical teams could
be working on the same patient. ‘Sit-reps’ (situation
reports) were used every 10–30 minutes to keep the
team updated of progress. The mnemonic ‘TBCS’
helped the team leader to remember the critical
information to be covered (explained in more detail
in Appendix 1 – available online.) Bringing the vital
physiological parameters and the surgical progress
together like this regularly helps reduce the risks of
tunnel vision or loss of situational awareness. It
also focuses the team to review their surgical plan
and change it if necessary.
6. At the end of surgery a ‘sign-out’ should be done. At
Camp Bastion, the intensive care unit (ICU) team came
to collect the patient. The sign-out is essential for both
the surgeons and the anaesthetist to inform the receiv-
ing ICU team as well as all the other members of the
theatre team about the patient’s injuries, what has been
done and what is left to do. By definition, DCS will focus
on the critical injuries causing haemorrhage or contam-
ination so many things will have been left to be dealt
with at second-look surgery when the patient’s physiol-
ogy has improved.
6.1. A debrief was done at the end before the team dis-
persed to other activities. This is important for clini-
cal feedback and also to allow staff to express their
feelings about the sometimes complex emotional,
moral and ethical dilemmas with which they have
dealt.
6.2. Further analysis of the case continued over the fol-
lowing days, including a weekly telephone confer-
ence morbidity and mortality meeting that involved
both the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham
and the US medical facility in Landstuhl, Germany,
until all learning points had been extracted and
dealt with.
Methods
Approval was obtained from the director of the Joint Medi-
cal Command prior to the start of the project (RCDM/Res/
Audit/1036/12/0230) as well as from the deployed medical
director of the hospital. Theatre staff attitudes to communi-
cation during the management of major trauma were
investigated by means of a standardised questionnaire.
This was prepared with advice from experts in psychology
and communication, and included 12 questions as well as
a visual analogue scoring system. This was used to get
information on the case and record the reactions of all
members of the team associated with the case. Free text
was also used to allow staff to express their personal opin-
ions. The questionnaire was confidential. The case inclu-
sion criteria were that the patient was severely injured and
required DCS.
Although the Trauma WHO Checklist paper had already
been published22 and widely distributed in predeployment
training, the surgeons, anaesthetists and theatre staff were
briefed again in Afghanistan prior to the start of the project
on the format for communication during cases in which it
was likely that DCR–DCS would be required. Posters were
placed around the theatre as an aide-mémoire for the com-
munication system proposed. Data were anonymised for
both the patient and the staff, and recorded on a standard
Excel® spreadsheet (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, US).
Results
Twenty cases were studied in a thirty-day period during
September 2012. Responses from 115 members of staff
were collected. Patients were all admitted to the hospital at
Camp Bastion with either gunshot or blast injuries. They
were haemodynamically shocked with a median pH of 7.25
(range: 6.83–7.40), a median base excess of -7mEq/l
(range: 0–-24mEq/l) and a median lactate of 4.99mmol/l
(range: 1.9–14.6mmol/l]. A median of 18 units of mixed
packed red cells and fresh frozen plasma were transfused
(9 units of each in a 1:1 ratio). The median time from
arrival to the first incision in theatre was 56 minutes
(range: 3–110 minutes). There was one death in this group.
The 115 responses from staff are shown in Table 2
(30 from surgeons, 23 from anaesthetists, 18 from operat-
ing department practitioners, 18 from scrub nurses, and 26
from others such as runners and transfusion staff). Overall,
88% of the theatre staff either agreed or strongly agreed
that they were aware of the injuries at the beginning of the
case, 91% said there were regular updates during the case
and 99% understood what was required of them as the
case progressed. Teamwork was found to be effective by
93% of staff members and the same proportion believed
there was good communication throughout the case. Over
two-thirds (69%) felt that regular sit-reps contributed to
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improved communication with only 10% feeling that they
could become annoying or unhelpful. Free text was
allowed to feed back specific comments (Table 3).
Discussion
The medical treatment facility at Camp Bastion has been a
unique environment for the treatment of the severely
injured since it opened in 2006. A process of data collec-
tion, audit and service improvement has led to continual
innovation and improvement.25 DCR–DCS is now the
standard of care for the severely injured patient,1,26 and
every step in the pathway from point of wounding to the
evacuation back to the UK has been considered in detail to
minimise the delays and optimise treatment. With the clo-
sure of the hospital, we feel it is important to capture the
logistical and clinical changes that occurred during its
lifetime.
In the complex environment of managing major trauma,
teamwork and non-technical skills are essential for peak
performance.12,14,16,17,27 Training started for the entire the-
atre team before arrival in Camp Bastion in the form of a
72-hour whole-hospital simulation.28 Care was consultant-
delivered throughout the patient journey, unlike in the
National Health Service where it is often only consultant-
led.29 It is this relatively recent acceptance of the complex-
ity of both medicine in general and the operating theatre
environment in particular30 that led to the development of
the checklist. Gawande found that this produced a 36%
reduction in complications and a 47% reduction in
deaths.31 The result was the worldwide acceptance of the
WHO checklist18,19 and the British Defence Medical Serv-
ices formally introduced it to the hospital at Camp Bastion
in 2010.
The original WHO checklist includes 19 questions and
takes approximately 2–5 minutes to complete. Unlike most
surgery, where the operation is seen as a distinct entity
from the preoperative or ward phase and the operative
plan is clear at the preoperative stage, severely injured
patients require treatment along the DCR–DCS sequence in
which resuscitation, identification of injuries, rapid surgi-
cal control of bleeding and management of life threatening
injuries are integrated seamlessly and occur concurrently.1
Human factors are essential in maintaining good team-
work.16,17 However, a single point checklist such as the
WHO checklist is not sufficient to promote optimal intrao-
perative team communication because the knowledge of
the injuries sustained and the dynamically changing phys-
iological derangement requires the surgical management
plan to evolve in light of this change.
Table 2 Results of questionnaire for optimising communications
Please answer the following questions by circling one response only, using the scale below.
0 1 2 3 4
Disagree strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Agree strongly
At the start (ie after the snap brief)
0 1 2 3 4
Q1 At the start, were you aware of the patient’s injuries? 3% 6% 4% 20% 68%
Q2 At the start of the operation, did you understand the
surgical plan?
1% 2% 9% 19% 69%
Q3 Did you know what was required of you at the beginning
of the case?
1% 1% 2% 11% 85%
During the case
Q4 Were there regular updates during the case? 1% 4% 4% 20% 71%
Q5 Were changes or problems during the case communicated
effectively to the entire team?
0% 1% 11% 20% 68%
Q6 Did you feel that you knew what was happening during
the case?
0% 2% 4% 21% 73%
Q7 Did you know what was required of you as the case
progressed?
0% 0% 1% 7% 92%
Communication
Q8 Did the team work effectively throughout the case? 0% 2% 6% 15% 78%
Q9 Was there good communication during the operation? 1% 4% 2% 20% 73%
Q10 Did you feel regular sit-reps helped to improve communication? 0% 6% 15% 20% 58%
Q11 Did you feel that you could communicate freely during the case? 0% 4% 3% 10% 83%
Q12 Were regular sit-reps helpful? 3% 7% 21% 34% 35%
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The fact that the hospital at Camp Bastion was probably
one of the busiest major trauma units in the world pro-
vided the background against which we could trial a spe-
cific protocol of communication for trauma. Following
discussions within the Defence Medical Services, it was felt
that to promote good communications for severely injured
patients, these would need to start in the resuscitation
room, continue throughout the operation and finish with a
formal sign-out; debrief should be done at this point as the
trauma team will usually disperse rapidly.
All military doctors, nurses and theatre personnel
involved were trained jointly in both trauma management
and teamwork. This occurred using cadavers for DCS and
high fidelity simulation for teamwork on the Military Opera-
tional Surgical Training course.15 Furthermore, to learn to
how to manage casualty flow, a whole-hospital simulation in
a hanger was used. Considered vital in all aspects of military
activity, clear communication is confirmed by the fact that
96% of respondents had a clear understanding of their role
at the beginning of the case and that 99% understood what
was required of them as the case progressed reflects the fact
that teamwork is already well honed in this small group of
clinicians. The biggest single innovation for this project was
the addition of the sit-reps, which formalised the communi-
cation during the progress of the case.
Having some flexibility in the timing of sit-reps was found
to be beneficial (eg waiting for the results of the blood gases
or thromboelastometry). Recognition that a key part of man-
aging the trauma patient is at the time of transition from the
OR to ICU led to the addition of the sign-out so that it could
be made clear to all staff and the team accepting the patient
exactly what had been performed as well as the goals for
management for the next few hours and days.
By identifying just a few key moments in the manage-
ment of complex trauma, we can focus minds on the
importance of good communication even when the team is
engrossed in performing DCS. This concept was well illus-
trated by the ‘10 seconds for 10 minutes’ principle.8 The
major advance on the WHO checklist described in our
guideline is the use of the sit-reps, which seek to continue
good communication practice in the intraoperative phase
and to remind the team of maintaining a dialogue.
Although this concept was already well known, it is fre-
quently characterised by open questions such as ‘how are
things going?’ while responses such as ‘we are keeping up’
are too vague to allow for meaningful dialogue and deci-
sion making. A simple protocol based on the mnemonic
‘TBCS’ reminds us of the importance of giving a minimum
dataset of information to get a fuller picture of the patients’
problems, their current physiological status and the evolv-
ing surgical plan. It does not intend, however, to reduce
other forms of communication that may be considered rel-
evant. Gawande found one unexpected result of the origi-
nal WHO checklist: it seemed to improve management in
areas not covered by the checklist presumably by facilitat-
ing better communication.30 We had similar findings,
reflected in the comments of the trauma team (Table 3).
Conclusions
This article has described the Camp Bastion system of
major trauma management, in which every moment of the
patient journey has been considered. Numerous improve-
ments in clinical management have been described includ-
ing DCS,1 use of thromboelastometry32 and massive
transfusion protocols.33 In addition, human factors and
good communication have been placed at the very centre
of our management approach. Identifying key moments for
vital communication in the DCR–DCS process and, in par-
ticular, the introduction of sit-reps has further enhanced
the communication in an already good team. As with all
guidelines, repeated use will encourage all the team mem-
bers to become comfortable with the terms and the proc-
ess. We would therefore recommend that this guideline be
introduced for communication in DCR–DCS and be taught
as part of the team preparations.
Table 3 Free text comments from theatre staff
Comments
Anaesthetist: Unstable patient. Comms very helpful to understand what was going on and how to proceed.
Anaesthetist: Feel the sit-reps formalises what is already done. Will probably become more user friendly with repetition.
Operating department practitioner: Patient’s injuries were not obvious and as patient hadn’t had a CT I knew what was required of
me but at times I felt overwhelmed with tasks. Sit-reps worked well to tie everything together.
Surgeon: The patient had dropped systolic blood pressure down to 60 without the surgical team being informed. Poor communication but
problem highlighted by the sit-reps.
Scrub nurse: The sit-reps were done at a time dictated by the anaesthetist. This made the operation and communication more smooth.
Transfusion team: This was the best case I’ve worked on yet. The anaesthetist was extremely professional. He discussed the plan at logical
intervals, he explained his clinical decisions, plans for products and follow-up tests were talked about with enough time to react. I
appreciated his teaching with me as well. I was also glad when the surgeons discussed their plans at the beginning and could gauge some
of the ups and downs ahead to communicate product needs to emergency department staff. Back in the emergency department also at the
beginning, the anaesthetist told us the target BP so at any given time, it was open communication to discuss a bolus. Great case.
Thank you.
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